The phenomenon of "irrational exuberance" around housing prices is now well established as a driving force of housing bubbles. However, the roles of credit supply and the mispricing of credit are less well understood. This article discusses the recent literature on the relationship between credit supply and housing prices in national and local markets, with a view to identifying gaps in understanding this relationship as well as the implications of these gaps for the ability of market participants and regulators to detect systemic risk. This article also connects the literature to this special issue, which emphasizes the importance of understanding local market conditions, including ways in which housing finance affects and is in turn affected by local markets.
INTRODUCTION
At the time of the Panic of 2007, few economists were predicting follow-on effects for the national economy.
1 In the U.S. in 2007, neither federal regulators nor private sector analysts identified the increase in systemic risk through the exposure of the financial system to the housing bubble. Many sophisticated investors and Wall Street institutions were more heavily tilted toward risky real estate investments than they had been in previous years. 2 Even as 1 With the implosion of firms providing subprime credit, this market shut off in 2007, leading to distress throughout the financial system. See Gorton (2009) and St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank (2014) . Federal Reserve policy makers met in August 2007, and according to a transcript of that meeting, Federal Reserve officials did not believe that housing foreclosures would cause a broader economic crisis. As Wilcox states in the transcript (page 19), forecasted real GDP growth for the next year and a half was reduced by ¼ percentage point. Even the Fed's most extreme scenario did not generate a recession. See the 7 August 2007 transcript, available at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20070807meeting.pdf. In September discussion of the longer term outlook predicted some slowing but no long term negative outcomes: "With credit markets expected to largely recover over coming quarters, growth of real GDP was projected to firm in 2009 to a pace a bit above the rate of growth of its potential." See Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee of September 18, 2007. 2 Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2011) and Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2012) discuss the failure of experts to identify increased risk.
3 Housing prices were recognized as being due for a fall by Fed economists by 2005. See Reddy (2011) and the following discussion. 4 Some economists, however, did believe that a recession was likely (Roubini 2007) . Given the lack of Fed awareness of the danger, this author commented in August 2007, "I made the following comment: "I came to Jackson Hole thinking there would be no recession, but I'm leaving thinking we could well have one" -reported in Fraher and Lanman (2007) . 5 See Shiller (2000) and Case, Quigley and Shiller (2011). issue, all of which focus on local markets and discuss how finance affects and is in turn affected by local markets.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on national credit supply and housing prices. Section 3 assesses regional house price models and the importance and difficulties of including credit factors. Section 4 concludes with a discussion of the role of diversification in the need for credit supply information.
6 Some were aware of the overextension of credit during the bubble years and the potential fall-out for housing prices. A number of market participants made speculative bets on a decline of housing values, see Zuckerman (2008) . However, the role of the supply of credit and its pricing received relatively less attention, even though the seizing up of credit markets arguably was the immediate cause of the financial panic and the precipitant of the subsequent severe decline of housing prices. 7 If such models include a credit factor, the variable included is the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury bond, rather than a measure of mortgage credit supply and pricing. Regional data on credit supply and mortgage terms, including pricing, are lacking, as discussed further below.
CREDIT AND NATIONAL HOUSING PRICES: RELATED LITERATURE
Housing is deeply embedded in and influenced by credit markets, as credit is required for most home purchases. The ability to borrow for new home purchases and to refinance at lower interest rates and at more favorable terms played a role in incentivizing and enabling the historic and rapid expansion in mortgage debt in the immediate years prior to the financial panic of 2007. Taking a longer perspective, prior to the crisis, mortgage rates declined and borrowing increased as share of GNP, over a period of several decades. This increase was used to fund greater home ownership and was also a source of credit that enabled median household consumption to increase more than otherwise possible, given the stagnation of real wages in the U.S. 8 The long-term secular decline in interest rates occurred on rates for all loan types including mortgages whose rates were also considerably lower than for consumer credit.
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It is, of course, now well known that the decline in mortgage interest rates was accompanied by a secular rise in inflation adjusted housing prices that began at the end of the 1990s and ratcheted up in the mid-2000s. Empirical studies, however, commonly find little evidence for a significant impact of borrowing costs, as measured by interest rates and mortgage costs, on housing prices. For instance, Glaeser, Gottlieb and Gyourko (2010) find that, although the inflation-adjusted yield on 10-year Treasury notes fell 120 basis points from 1996 to 2006, this decline cannot explain more than one-fifth of the rise in prices over this period of the greatest house price expansion in the history of the U.S. Conversely, other economic fundamentals such as income, GDP, or population growth are generally found to have a larger impact on housing prices. As in the previous literature, 10 interest rates are not cited as a major factor in house price evolution either in the bubble years or earlier. This is despite the conceptual importance of interest rates as a driver of the price-to-rent ratio for housing as for other financial assets.
The more recent literature focusing on the supply of mortgage credit, rather than the interest rate, does commonly find measures of credit supply to be significantly associated with house prices. For the bubble years, Levitin, Pavlov and Wachter (2012) study the evolution of credit and house prices on a national scale and show the link between the aggregate volume of credit and the national price-to-rent ratio. They find that the national price-to-rent ratio grows steadily during the bubble years, peaking in 2006, with a sharp decline thereafter, with the evolution closely aligned with the growth in lending volume, rather than, for example, the growth in income. However, this correlation of lending volume and the price-to-rent ratio is insufficient evidence to infer a causal link between these two measures.
There is a growing body of literature that focuses on the nature and direction of causality in the relationship between the volume of mortgage debt and house prices. For example,
Berlinghieri (2012) and Anundsen and Jansen (2013) employ structural vector error correction models to identify whether mortgage expansion Granger-causes price rises or whether rising prices Granger-cause an expansion in mortgage credit. These studies generally support bidirectional causality. When interest rates and credit supply are jointly included, credit supply is found to be significant in the evolution of house prices, while interest rates are not. Jurgilas and 10 See Himmelberg, Meyer and Sinai for an example and discussion. Interest rates as measured by the 10-year Treasury were increasing in the 2003-2006 bubble years, thus their evolution could not cause or contribute to price rises. However, Levitin and Wachter (2012) show that returns on mortgage-backed securities in this period were decreasing.
Lansing (2013) test for the impact of interest rates and the mortgage supply on housing prices in
Norway from 1986 to 2008, using a structural vector error correction model, with simulations used to quantify the effects of exogenous shocks on house prices and credit. They find a feedback loop between house prices and credit expansion but that interest rates indirectly and weakly influence house prices.
Mortgage supply both impacts and is impacted by housing prices, preventing its use as an identifier of a potential housing bubble. The evidence of bidirectional causality implies that housing bubbles cannot be identified relying solely on information about mortgage debt, without identifying the underlying factors that drive both. I argue elsewhere in this article that the missing factor behind the increase in mortgage debt and housing prices is the decreasing cost and increasing availability of mortgage credit, in the face of increasing risk. When the mispricing of mortgage debt becomes apparent, the result is illiquidity and subsequently, a solvency crisis.
The correlation of mortgage debt and house prices does not in itself constitute a sign of danger. In the U.S., as elsewhere, an increase in mortgage debt may partly be attributed to "financial innovation" that overcomes barriers to lending and decreases risk through enabling income smoothing. 11 Two unidentified factors, if known, could have made the crisis easier to predict. The first of these is the price of mortgage debt for a given loan quality; that is, the mortgage interest rate conditional upon the embedded risk. The second is the aggregate shift in quality of underwriting and the credit composition of the overall book of business. To deter a systemic crisis of course requires foreknowledge of the danger as systemic risk develops.
Crucial to this is knowledge of the price of mortgage debt conditional upon the embedded risk 11 See Favilukis et al. (2012) for a description of a model in which financial innovations through financial market liberalization and technological gains allow households to smooth their consumption by reducing the risk in the economy and the risk of investments, enabling higher asset prices. See Levitin and Wachter (2013) for a discussion.
and the credit quality of the overall book of business and the relationship of these to housing prices.
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THE LIMITATIONS OF MODELING REGIONAL HOUSE PRICES IN IDENTIFYING NATIONAL BUBBLES
The aftermath of the mortgage crisis has seen attention focus on the relationship between credit supply, interest rates, and housing prices. However, the inclusion of such factors in pricing models is not standard. Housing price models are regionally based and focus on fundamental factors of physical supply and demand rather than credit factors. In addition, regional data on mortgage availability, terms, and pricing, for a given quality of credit, are not readily available.
Most empirical models predict regional house prices using data on Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs); see for instance Leamer (2003) , Follain and Sklarz (2005) , Goodman and Thibodeau (2008), Anundsen and Heeboll-Christensen (2013), and Follain and Giertz (2014) . 13 These models generally use a deviation of the value-to-rent ratio or user cost from the average to detect disequilibrium. During the boom period, these models consistently suggested positive errors for regional markets across the U.S., suggesting an omitted variable bias from a national factor in the evolution of house prices. In the years 2003 to 2006, the error terms are particularly large and suggest that the fundamentals included in these models fail to capture the 12 See footnote 17 below for further discussion. Evidence on the increasing availability of credit in these years is found in Davidson, Levin and Wachter (2014) and Barakova et al. (2013) . The latter, tests for an increase in the availability of credit between 2003 and 2007, and finds that traditional constraints (both credit quality and income based) to homeownership declined substantially. This is consistent with the explosive expansion in these years of subprime mortgages which did not require credit qualification and alt-A mortgages which did not require income qualification. 14 Anundsen and Heeboll-Christensen (2013) also focus on local differences in supply elasticity. Using data from the bubble years for MSAs, they find that prices rose more in the short run in inelastic markets but not in the long run.
Local market characteristics such as supply elasticity as well as the supply of credit matter for regional differences in price dynamics. In particular, the rapidity of the historically unprecedented increase in prices in affected markets may have been due to a regime shift in supply elasticity as well as in availability of credit.
high empirical market prices for most MSAs. Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) The incorporation of regional variations in the price of credit relative to risk shows a twoway interrelationship between the availability of credit and house prices. The recent literature shows that easier credit on a regional scale is related to higher housing prices, all else equal, and that the relationship of the relative cost of credit to house price appreciation across economies is, in the cross-section, predictive of the extent of price declines after real estate bubbles peak (Pavlov and Wachter 2009 ). Nonetheless, data on the regional availability and pricing of mortgage credit were not and are not available real-time on a regional level. 15 Thus, these indicators could not have been and cannot be incorporated into the regional house price models that were and are widely used to identify the extent to which house prices are based on fundamentals.
MARKET DIVERSIFICATION AND THE NEED FOR CREDIT SUPPLY
INFORMATION
Based in part on the inability of house price models to explain price hikes, some market observers warned that a bubble might be forming, but few understood just how catastrophic it would be when the bubble popped. For example, the meeting minutes of the Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee from 2005 and 2006 show that the Fed's economists believed that prices were above long-term fundamentals by 20 percent, yet they did not expect a recession.
Rather, the prevailing belief was that any price decline would be "contained," and that prices would return to their normal relationship to rents, through rent growth rather than price declines.
Data on the deterioration of lending standards, the extent to which risky mortgages had accumulated in the financial system, the pricing of risky credit, and the extent of financial institutions' exposure to the risk of price declines were neither monitored nor collected.
The Fed was not alone. "As regulators, we just have to trust that rating agencies are going to monitor CDOs," said Kevin Fry, chairman of the Invested Asset Working Group of the U.S. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, in 2007. "We can't get there. We don't have the resources to get our arms around it." The U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency agreed. "We rely on the rating agencies to provide a rating," said Kathryn Dick, the deputy comptroller for credit and market risk (Tomlinson and Evans 2007) .
A conceptual reason for the lack of tracking of national mortgage debt data was the understanding that default risk was local and could be diversified away. For example, the packagers of CDOs were required to diversify by accumulating securities across investment banks. The reliance on diversification missed the critical risk from correlation. If local markets were all exposed to the national underpricing of mortgage risk, diversification implies that all securities represent a put option on the national housing market. In fact, diversification meant that mortgage securities were going to decline in value at the same time, triggering a simultaneous rush to the exits. Differences in mortgage securities' exposure to risk was not known.
The lack of transparency not only shrouded risk, but it also magnified the ensuing panic as it generated a lack of trust. Without knowledge of which financial intermediaries were holding the most risky assets, all were in question, causing credit to seize and the market to freeze. What mattered was the implication of the national underpricing of credit risk for the viability of the banking system as a whole.
The Dodd-Frank Act has attempted to mitigate this accumulation of systemic risk by requiring originators to retain 5 percent of the default risk on any mortgage that does not qualify as a "qualified residential mortgage". However, this provision does not address the need to track the characteristics of that debt. What made this bubble different from, and so much worse than, previous cycles in the U.S. was the role of the expansion in mortgage debt in the evolution of housing prices, or the increase in housing prices that was due to the increased availability of mortgage debt. Regulators, originators, insurers, and "rate investors" unconcerned about credit risk arguably had little knowledge of the correlation risk between the real estate assets that were being traded. Existing knowledge of regulated institutions' direct exposure to their own lending risk is insufficient. The lesson of this crisis is that mortgage credit supply, from all sources, affects house price risk.
In short, while the expansion of credit was known, the quality and market mis-pricing of that credit were not known. Many economists were questioning whether housing price increases were entirely justified by fundamentals. However, it seemed that financial intermediaries had diversified away much of the risk involved in real estate investments, creating a false sense of security when it turned out that financial intermediaries 16 had substantially increased the overall risk of the system by leveraging assets with high correlations. This correlation risk was the one risk that market participants, including regulators, took for granted as under control. At the same time, this correlation risk is the reason that the decline of the housing market spread so quickly throughout the banking system, making the Great Recession more severe than any other since the 16 Herring and Wachter (2000 Wachter ( , 2003 show that financial intermediaries propagate housing bubbles by relying on appraisals based on market prices in their lending decisions. Moreover, they also show that financial intermediaries further propagate housing price booms by lowering lending standards due to a perception of decreasing risk as prices rise. An instrument to short sell real estate when prices depart from fundamentals and aggregate information on credit quality to inform that trading, could help complete the market and mitigate bubbles, as discussed in Pavlov and Wachter (2009) and Levitin, Pavlov, and Wachter (2012) .
